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A recent article in the New York Times states that “food 
scares have become as common as midwestern tornadoes” 
(Harris and Belluck, 2009). It can certainly seem that way, 
especially with the recent series of high profile problems 
with a wide range of foods. Shortly after the government 
warned people to avoid all fresh spinach in the fall of 2006 
(FDA, 2007), there was an extensive recall of pet food con-
taminated by melamine in 2007 (FDA, 2008a). This was 
followed, in early 2008, by the largest meat recall in his-
tory; more than 143 million pounds of beef were recalled 
because the company was slaughtering and selling the meat 
from “downer” cows (Healy and Schmit, 2008). During 
spring  and  summer  of  2008,  the  United  States  had  its 
largest foodborne illness outbreak in over a decade. More 
than 1,400 people became ill from Salmonella Saintpaul, 
originally believed to be caused by consuming fresh toma-
toes, but ultimately linked to fresh jalapeno peppers from 
Mexico (FDA, 2008b). This year, the U.S. experienced the 
largest food recall in its history, with more than 2,100 food 
products recalled as a result of Salmonella Typhimurium 
contamination linked to the Peanut Corporation of Amer-
ica (FDA, 2009a). A smaller but significant pistachio recall 
followed closely on the heels of the peanut butter recalls 
(FDA, 2009b).
Given  this  sequence  of  large,  well-publicized,  and 
closely timed food recalls, it may not be surprising that the 
American public’s confidence in our food supply is decreas-
ing (Consumer Reports National Research Center, 2008). 
Overview of Spinach and Tomato Warnings
The research presented here is derived from two national 
telephone surveys of Americans. The first survey was about 
the 2006 E. coli outbreak associated with fresh spinach, 
and it was fielded five weeks after the FDA advisory had 
been lifted. The second survey, regarding the 2008 warn-
ings to consumers to avoid eating tomatoes thought to 
have been contaminated with Salmonella Saintpaul, was 
fielded a week and a half after the FDA advisory was lifted. 
The results from these surveys provide valuable insights 
into the challenges and successes of communicating with 
the public about food safety. More details about the survey 
are presented after a brief description of each outbreak.
The two outbreaks studied were similar in that both 
were national in scope, involved fresh produce, and the 
advisories to consumers changed over time. At the begin-
ning of each of these advisories, the warnings were about 
an entire class of fresh produce, and were not delimited by 
brand, lot number, or even geography, although in each 
case, as the investigation developed, the warnings changed 
and become increasingly specific. 
Warning about E. coli O157:H7 in Spinach, 2006
On Sept. 14, 2006, the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) issued an advisory to consumers not to eat 
bagged fresh spinach because of suspected contamination 
by E. coli O157:H7. The advisory was ultimately lifted 
on Sept. 22, when the FDA advised the public that they 
could be confident in consuming spinach grown outside 
the three counties in California that had been implicated 
in the outbreak. Thus, the warning had been in effect for a 
total of one week and one day.
The information from the FDA changed slightly over 
the course of the advisory. In its second day, the adviso-
ry was expanded to include all fresh spinach because the 
FDA had been informed that bagged spinach was some-
times sold in an unbagged form at the retail level. As the 
investigation continued, the focus narrowed to products 
from Natural Selection Foods, LLC, of San Juan Bautista, 
California, with “Best if Used by Dates” of Aug. 17, 2006 
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It was not until Sept. 20th that the 
FDA mentioned that it was safe to eat 
frozen spinach, canned spinach and 
spinach  included  in  premade  meals 
manufactured  by  food  companies. 
The following day, the FDA issued a 
statement that they, working closely 
with the CDC and the State of Cali-
fornia, had determined that the spin-
ach implicated in the outbreak had 
been grown in three counties in Cali-
fornia. The FDA was cautious in stat-
ing that produce other than spinach 
grown in these counties had not been 
implicated in the outbreak, however, 
the  advisory  against  eating  spinach 
was still in effect.
Ultimately, nearly 200 people in 
26 states were reported to the CDC 
as  having  potentially  been  infected 
with  the  outbreak  strain  of  E.  coli 
O157:H7 (FDA, 2007). More than 
100 of these cases were hospitalized, 
and 31 developed a form of kidney 
failure called hemolytic uremic syn-
drome  (HUS).  This  resulted  in  the 
deaths of three people in confirmed 
cases of infection associated with the 
outbreak.
Warnings about Salmonella Saintpaul in 
Peppers and Tomatoes, 2008
The  Salmonella  Saintpaul  outbreak 
lasted  considerably  longer  than  the 
spinach warning, and the FDA’s ad-
vice  to  consumers  was  much  more 
complex.  Although  initially  limited 
to consumers in Texas and New Mex-
ico who were warned not to eat raw 
red plum, red Roma, or round red 
tomatoes, FDA expanded its warning 
to consumers nationwide on June 7, 
2008. 
Because  not  all  types  of  toma-
toes were implicated in the outbreak, 
FDA’s advice to consumers was com-
plex. The public was told they could 
continue  to  eat  cherry  tomatoes, 
grape  tomatoes,  and  tomatoes  sold 
with the vine still attached, or toma-
toes grown at home. In addition, the 
FDA  established,  and  subsequently 
updated, an online list of states, terri-
tories, and countries where tomatoes 
are grown but which had not been as-
sociated with the outbreak. Consum-
ers were warned that they should not 
eat the implicated types of tomatoes 
unless they had been harvested in one 
of the areas on the FDA’s list. 
On June 30, the CDC announced 
that  they  had  not  found  any  con-
taminated  tomatoes  and  they  were 
broadening  their  investigation  to 
encompass  food  items  commonly 
consumed with tomatoes. On July 9, 
the CDC reported that accumulated 
data from its investigations indicated 
that jalapeño peppers caused some ill-
nesses but did not explain all the cases 
associated with the outbreak, and it 
advised  high-risk  consumers—the 
immunocompromised,  elderly  and 
infants—to avoid consuming raw ja-
lapeño and serrano peppers. 
While  the  pepper  warning  re-
mained in place, the FDA withdrew 
its tomato warning on July 17, stat-
ing that investigators had determined 
that fresh tomatoes now available in 
the domestic market were not associ-
ated with the current outbreak. Thus, 
the tomato warning had been in ef-
fect for six weeks and two days, and 
the tomato warning continued to be 
covered in the news coverage of the 
ongoing  investigation  and  pepper 
warning. Finally, on Aug. 28th, FDA 
declared the outbreak over and lifted 
its final warning regarding the con-
sumption  of  jalapeño  peppers  and 
serrano peppers. 
Ultimately,  1,442  reported  cases 
of illness in 43 states were linked to 
the outbreak. Of these, at least 286 
resulted  in  hospitalization,  and  the 
infection may have contributed to the 
deaths of two individuals. By the time 
it was over, the Salmonella Saintpaul 
contamination  had  resulted  in  the 
largest foodborne illness outbreak in 
over a decade. 
Risk Communication Lessons from 
These Outbreaks
We  contacted  two  large,  indepen-
dent samples of American adults by 
telephone (1200 in 2006 and 1101 
in 2008). All of the data presented 
here have been weighted, so that our 
sample is representative of all Ameri-
cans (within a margin of error of ap-
proximately ± 4%). We posed many 
similar, but not identical, questions 
in each of the two surveys, and report 
a selection of our findings here (the 
full  reports  can  be  found  at  www.
foodpolicyinstitute.org).  We  chose 
to focus on tomatoes, and not pep-
pers, in the 2008 survey because the 
tomato warning received more media 
coverage and also because, unlike the 
pepper warning, it had ended by the 
time we began to field the survey. The 
spinach survey was fielded over the 
course  of  November,  2006,  and  all 
interviews were conducted five weeks 
or longer after the warning had been 
lifted. The tomato survey was fielded 
much sooner after the lifting of the 
warning,  beginning  one  and  a  half 
weeks  after  the  warning  was  lifted. 
However, it was in the field longer, 
for almost two months, during Au-
gust and September, 2008. 
The  following  sections  provide 
an  overview  of  the  most  important 
risk communication lessons that can 
be learned from these large national 
outbreaks.
The Vast Majority of Americans Heard 
about These Warnings
Communication  about  both  the 
spinach and the tomato warnings was 
very successful. Eighty seven percent 
of  Americans  had  heard  about  the 
spinach  recall,  and  93%  about  the 
tomato  warning.  Fewer  had  heard 
about the 2008 pepper warning, only 
69%. This is likely because the warn-
ing was in place for a shorter period 
of  time,  fewer  Americans  consume 
peppers (Blisard and Stewart, 2007), 
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high-risk groups. However, the per-
centage  aware  of  all  three  of  these 
warnings  is  quite  high  when  com-
pared with awareness of other, local 
foodborne illness outbreaks (Patrick, 
Griffin, Voetsch and Mead, 2007).
We asked the 2006 respondents if 
they consumed spinach prior to the 
warning, and the 2008 respondents 
about  their  tomato  consumption 
prior to the warning. For those re-
spondents who had not heard of the 
warning, we simply asked “Do you 
consume  [spinach/tomatoes]?”  We 
found that among those who did not 
consume the affected food, there was 
a lower likelihood of being aware of 
the warning. It is not surprising that 
those who did not consume spinach 
or tomatoes were less aware of the re-
spective warnings, and this indicates 
that some people may simply not pay 
attention to information about food 
recalls that they deem not relevant to 
them.
Americans Confused about Foods In-
cluded in Warnings 
In  2006,  The  FDA  warned  against 
eating  any  fresh  spinach,  and  their 
advisory  expanded  in  the  first  few 
days to explicitly include both bagged 
and loose fresh spinach. Frozen and 
canned  spinach  were  explicitly  ex-
cluded from the warning. While 95% 
of those aware of the spinach outbreak 
knew that “bagged fresh spinach” was 
recalled, only 68% knew that “loose 
fresh  spinach”  had  been  recalled. 
When we asked about the types of 
spinach that were NOT recalled, we 
found that about 1 in 5 incorrectly 
thought that frozen and canned spin-
ach had been recalled (22% and 16%, 
respectively). Of note is that similar 
percentages  said  that  they  did  not 
know if frozen or canned spinach had 
been recalled (21% and 14%, respec-
tively) which means that almost half 
of  Americans  were  either  wrong  or 
unsure about whether these two types 
of spinach had been implicated in the 
outbreak. 
The  communications  about  the 
types of tomatoes that were consid-
ered  unsafe  to  eat  were  even  more 
confusing than those about spinach. 
When  asked  how  much  they  agree 
with the statement, “You knew which 
types  of  tomatoes  the  public  was 
warned  not  to  eat,”  only  31%  said 
that they “strongly agreed.” A signifi-
cant number of respondents “strongly 
disagreed” (23%) and the remainder 
fell in the middle. 
While the details differed in each 
of these instances, what did not dif-
fer is that the specifics of the advice 
from the FDA were not clear to many 
Americans. The messages were neces-
sarily complex, but the complexities 
left  many  confused.  Unfortunately, 
there is no reason to think future re-
calls will be less complex.
Most Americans Avoid the Contaminated 
Food
In both surveys, we asked a series of 
questions  about  whether  Americans 
ate the potentially contaminated food 
during the warnings. This is of par-
ticular  concern  given  the  potential 
public health consequences of ignor-
ing  these  warnings.  We  found  that 
approximately  one-in-eight  Ameri-
cans (13%) who were aware of the re-
call and ate spinach prior to the recall 
reported having eaten fresh spinach 
during  the  recall.  Moreover,  nearly 
three-quarters  of  these  (74%)  said 
that they knew about the recall when 
they ate it.
Similarly, we found that a small 
but significant percentage of Ameri-
cans ate the implicated types of fresh 
tomatoes during the tomato warning. 
Eleven  percent  of  Americans  disre-
garded the FDA’s advice, and know-
ingly ate the types of tomatoes they 
had been warned not to eat.
People May Try to “Decontaminate” the 
Product 
In both recalls, some Americans re-
ported  performing  behaviors  that 
they  believed  would  make  the  po-
tentially  contaminated  food  safe  to 
eat, often in direct contradiction of 
what  the  FDA  has  stated.  In  both 
surveys, many of those who reported 
that  they  had  knowingly  eaten  the 
foods that they had been warned not 
to eat told interviewers that they had 
done something they thought would 
make  the  food  safe,  such  as  wash-
ing or cooking it. However, in both 
warnings, the FDA specifically stated 
that neither of those actions were suf-
ficient to make the food safe to eat.
We  asked  additional  questions 
about washing fresh produce in the 
2006  survey.  Regardless  of  whether 
they had heard of the spinach recall, 
44%  of  Americans  thought  it  true 
that properly washing contaminated 
food makes it safe to eat; it does not. 
Moreover, nearly half of those aware 
of the recall (48%) reported that the 
spinach recall caused them to wash 
foods,  including  those  other  than 
spinach, more thoroughly. 
The issue of people trying to “de-
contaminate” rather than discarding 
potentially contaminated foods may 
become  even  more  relevant  as  the 
economy worsens and more Ameri-
cans  struggle  to  feed  their  families. 
Just as some families in need adopt 
strategies  of  eating  food  that  is  no 
longer  fresh  enough  to  consume 
(Kempson et al., 2002), an increasing 
number of Americans may be loathe 
to discard food that they have paid 
for, and may devise their own strat-
egies,  sometimes  ill-advised,  to  at-
tempt render the food edible for their 
family.
Americans More Aware of Advisories 
Beginning than Ending
By  the  time  these  national  surveys 
were  fielded,  the  relevant  warn-
ings had been lifted. In the case of 
the spinach survey, the warning had 
been lifted six weeks prior to the one 
month data collection period, and the 
tomato warning had been lifted one 
and a half weeks prior to the month 
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Moving Forward
As our ability to identify these types 
of  outbreaks  improves,  and  as  our 
food  system  becomes  increasingly 
interconnected,  we  are  likely  to  en-
counter large scale recalls and warn-
ings more frequently. In addition, our 
foodborne illness surveillance system 
requires  time  to  accurately  identify 
the food that is causing an outbreak, 
and as a result of this we are likely to 
continue to receive dynamic, chang-
ing messages from the FDA. 
Based  on  the  data  reported 
here, we know that the vast major-
ity  of  Americans  are  hearing  about 
the FDA’s warnings to avoid certain 
foods—the  initial  warning  is  get-
ting through. However, the specifics 
of which products they are meant to 
avoid are often not well known. This 
is  of  particular  importance  in  cases 
like  the  recent  peanut  butter  recall, 
where over 1,800 products have cur-
rently  been  recalled,  but  the  major 
retail brands on the market have not 
been implicated. These messages in-
volve many details about the specific 
products affected, and what is consid-
ered “safe” to eat changes over time. 
Survey  research  conducted  over  the 
course  of  an  outbreak,  rather  than 
once the warning has been lifted, may 
help  to  better  understand  the  chal-
lenges of adequately communicating 
about FDA warnings.
While the initial message is getting 
through  to  the  public,  the  all-clear 
message is not. The results presented 
here do not tell us why this is the case: 
whether it is because the media are less 
likely to cover the all-clear messages, 
the  complexity  of  the  messages,  or 
some other factors. However, future 
research should focus on understand-
ing why this crucial piece of the warn-
ing  communication  is  not  reaching 
such a large percentage of the public. 
Ideally,  this  research  would  happen 
during  the  recall  and  its  immediate 
aftermath, unlike the two surveys dis-
cussed here which both were fielded 
after the advisories had ended. 
We  asked  all  participants  who 
were aware of the warnings a series 
of questions about whether the warn-
ings had been lifted. Again, the sur-
vey was fielded more than six weeks 
after the FDA had lifted the advisory, 
saying that consumers could be con-
fident in eating spinach grown out-
side the three counties in California 
that  had  been  implicated  in  the  E. 
coli  contamination.  Although  a  sig-
nificant amount of time had passed, 
13% of those aware of the warning 
reported incorrectly that “the spinach 
recall is still in effect” (a combination 
of 7% said this was definitely “true” 
and 6% said it was “likely true”) and 
nearly 18% said they were not sure. 
About half (55%) said that it was def-
initely “false” that the spinach recall 
was still in effect and 14% said that 
it was “likely false.” Thus, at the time 
the survey was conducted, almost half 
(45%) of people who were aware of 
the spinach recall were not confident 
that the recall had ended. 
We  found  a  very  similar  story 
with the tomato warning. When we 
presented  the  statement,  “The  to-
mato warning is currently in effect,” 
only  43%  said  that  they  “strongly 
disagreed.”  Seven percent “strongly 
agreed,” and the remaining 50% ei-
ther did not know or were not sure. 
One possible reason that fewer people 
were aware that the tomato warning 
was over may be that the interviews 
were conducted much closer to the 
date on which the warning was lifted.
Some Will Never Again Eat the Affected 
Food
We  asked  people  whether  they  had 
eaten spinach and tomatoes since the 
warnings had been lifted. We told ev-
ery respondent that the warnings had 
been lifted just prior to asking about 
postwarning  consumption,  so  that 
even those who were not aware at the 
start of the interview were by the time 
we asked this question. Because of the 
complexity  of  the  tomato  warning, 
we  simply  asked  if  the  respondents 
had  eaten  any  tomatoes  since  the 
warning, and not if they had eaten 
the kinds that were included in the 
warning. Of those who ate tomatoes 
prior to the warning, 74% reported 
that  they  had  eaten  tomatoes  since 
the warning was lifted. 
Fewer  had  gone  back  to  eating 
spinach at the time of our interview. 
Just  over  four-in-ten  respondents 
(44%) who had heard about the re-
call  and  ate  spinach  reported  that 
they  had  eaten  spinach  since  the 
recall  ended.  These  respondents  re-
ported that it took approximately two 
weeks after the recall ended for them 
to resume eating spinach. Those who 
had not yet eaten spinach since the 
recall said it would take an average of 
about two months for them to start 
eating fresh spinach again, and their 
estimates ranged from one day to one 
year. However, 5% of those who ate 
spinach  and  heard  about  the  recall 
say they will never eat fresh spinach 
again.
Not only was a small minority of 
Americans  saying  that  they  would 
never eat spinach again in the wake of 
the E. coli contamination, but some 
reported avoiding other similar foods. 
Nearly one-fifth of those aware of the 
spinach recall said they were avoiding 
other bagged produce as a result of 
the spinach recall.
Even those who did not eat spin-
ach  prior  to  the  warning  were  af-
fected by the spinach outbreak. Many 
reported that they also stopped buy-
ing bagged produce; in fact, with the 
same frequency as those who did eat 
spinach prior to the warning. There 
are a number of lessons to be learned 
here. Food recalls can have an impact 
on the sale of similar related items. In 
addition,  even  people  who  did  not 
consume a recalled product prior to 
the recall are affected by it, and are 
likely  to  change  their  consumption 
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One way of increasing awareness 
of the end of recalls and advisories is 
for retailers to send out the all-clear 
messages. Many retailers have begun 
the practice of letting their custom-
ers know about advisories and recalls 
of  foods  they’ve  purchased  in  the 
past, through letters, phone calls, and 
printed on receipts, so it would be a 
logical for them to also tell consumers 
when they have ended. 
In  sum,  simplifying  messages 
wherever  possible,  seeking  multiple 
channels through which to commu-
nicate with the public, and helping 
the  public  to  understand  why  they 
should heed the advice of the FDA 
may  help  Americans  better  under-
stand and better adhere to warnings 
about food safety. 
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